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ABSTRACT: A well-known problem in the health sciences is the distorted research agenda: the agenda features too 
little research that is tailored to the health problems of the poor, and it features too little research that 
supports the development of other solutions to health problems than medicines (e.g., change of lifestyle). 
This article analyzes these two sub-problems in more detail, and assesses several strategies to deal with 
them, resulting in some specific recommendations that indicate what governments should do to make the 
research agenda in the health sciences less distorted. 
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1. Introduction 
In the past decades, science became more and more commercialized; more and more research 
is designed to serve specific commercial interests of for-profit companies, rather than to serve the 
epistemic interests of independent scientists or humanitarian interests of society. This trend has 
caused several problems, as well as tumult in the academic community. By far the most attention 
is paid to problems in biomedical research. This article focuses on two problems in the health 
sciences that can be linked to the commercialization of science: (1) the agenda in the health 
sciences features too little research that is tailored to the health problems of the poor,1 and (2) the 
agenda in the health sciences features too little research that supports the development of other 
solutions to health problems than medicines (e.g., change of lifestyle). 
After elucidating these two ways in which the research agenda is skewed (section 2), I discuss 
several strategies to reduce these two kinds of distortion (section 3 discusses several proposals on 
how to deal with the first kind of distortion, and section 4 presents and assesses strategies to 
tackle the second kind of distortion), resulting in some specific recommendations for 
governments. My recommendations are compared with earlier policy proposals (James Robert 
Brown, Thomas Pogge and Julian Reiss) in section 5, and I conclude in section 6. 
                                                 
1
 Throughout the article, I use the term ‘the poor’ to describe populations in developing countries, and not ‘poor’ 
people in developed countries. The reason is that in many developed countries, medicine costs are partly or fully 
covered by a publicly funded healthcare system, which enables ‘poor’ people in these countries to purchase 
expensive medicines. 
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2. Two kinds of distortion 
2.1. Health problems of the poor 
A first way in which the research agenda is distorted in the health sciences is that health 
researchers pay disproportionately little attention to the health problems of the poor. While the 
health problems of the affluent, including their most trivial ailments such as acne and hair loss, 
are extensively investigated, life-threatening diseases that disproportionately affect the poor 
receive only little research attention (Carrier 2008, 219; Pogge 2009a, 81; Reiss & Kitcher 2009, 
264). This problem is also known as the problem of neglected diseases. Often cited examples of 
neglected diseases are tuberculosis and malaria, but data on R&D investments suggest that other 
equally high-burden diseases, such as pneumonia and diarrhoeal illnesses, are even more 
neglected (Moran et al. 2009). 
The problem of neglected diseases can in part be explained by the increase of industry support 
of biomedical research. The pharmaceutical industry is mainly interested in biomedical research 
that contributes to the development of products that can be sold with a large profit margin. As 
poor people cannot afford such expensive products, investigating their diseases is not very 
interesting from a business perspective, contrary to investigating the diseases of those who do 
have the money to afford them (WHO 2006, 28-29; Pogge 2009a, 81). 
Of course, there are also diseases from which both the rich and the poor suffer (e.g., diabetes, 
cancer). The poor can then benefit from the solutions developed for the people with purchasing 
power. But this is not always the case: the poor often lack the resources to obtain the products 
developed for the rich. So research and development (R&D) for preventive, diagnostic and 
therapeutic tools that are adapted to the resources and social and economic conditions of the poor, 
is needed (WHO 2006, 28). However, for-profit pharmaceutical companies are only minimally 
interested in such R&D, as it does not provide the large profit margin they seek. 
But the increasing industry support of biomedical research is only part of the explanation. 
Public R&D funds go, just as private R&D funds, primarily to research on the health problems of 
the rich. This is because public R&D funds of high-income countries, which have the largest 
R&D budgets at their disposal, are primarily allocated to research that is tailored to their own 
health issues, rather than to the health issues of middle- and low-income countries. As the World 
Health Organization (WHO) has put it: 
 
The significant fact about public funding of R&D is that its focus is predominantly shaped by 
domestic priorities. Thus, the priorities for public sector R&D funding in developed countries 
will necessarily be shaped by their own disease burden (mainly Type I diseases and 
HIV/AIDS), and on finding solutions that reflect the resources they have available for new 
methods of diagnosis, prevention and treatment. Although accurate figures are hard to come 
by, the global imbalance in publicly funded research in relation to the health needs of 
developing countries is likely to follow the same trends as the global imbalance in private 
funding driven by market forces. (WHO 2006, 59) 
2.2. Alternative solutions to health problems 
A second way in which the research agenda is distorted in the health sciences is that the 
agenda is skewed towards R&D for medicines. While R&D for medicines is extensively 
supported, few resources are allocated to research that supports the development of other 
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solutions to health problems. Solutions for which research funding is hard to obtain, are: diets, 
exercise schemes, guidelines on how to avoid being infected by a certain disease, measures to 
reduce pollution, measures to eliminate social disparities in access to proper nutrition, decent 
housing, and medical care, measures to eliminate exploitation and unhealthy working conditions, 
etc. Research funding is hard to obtain for such solutions because they are not commercially 
interesting (also see Brown 2008a, 2008b; De Vreese, Weber & Van Bouwel 2010). 
Distortion towards R&D for medicines seems mainly due to the fact that a lot of health 
research is supported by industry. In general, for-profit companies only invest in health research 
if this has high returns. Therefore, it is easier to find industry funding for research that holds out 
prospects of a lucrative product, that is, R&D for medicines that can be sold to people with 
sufficient purchasing power, than for research that is not commercially promising. But the 
problem is not restricted to industry funded research. The Bayh-Dole Act, which has been 
enacted by the United States in 1980, permits government funded agencies, such as universities, 
to obtain patents on products that are developed using federal grant money (Siepmann 2004, 209; 
WHO 2006, 38; Patino 2009, 139). Other countries have adopted similar legislation (Siepmann 
2004, 220-224; Mowery & Sampat 2005, 123). These patents enable government funded 
agencies to make money on the basis of the products they develop. As such, government funded 
agencies are, just as for-profit companies, stimulated to develop lucrative products instead of 
solutions such as lifestyle changes or social measures. 
3. Health problems of the poor 
3.1. Pull funding 
One strategy to promote research that is tailored to the health problems of the poor is to 
establish a prize fund that is used to reward companies that develop a medicine for a neglected 
disease.2 For-profit companies will anticipate these prizes and invest in neglected-disease 
research. There are several ways in which this strategy could be implemented. The first is an 
Advance Market Commitment (AMC) for a neglected-disease medicine. The idea is that a prize 
fund is committed in advance to make payments to any company that can develop and sell a 
qualifying medicine for a certain neglected disease. To qualify, the medicine has to meet 
predetermined standards of efficacy and safety. The payments are payments per unit, which 
means that a company gets money from the fund for every unit of the medicine it sells. Once the 
prize fund is empty, the AMC is finished.3 
A second way in which prize money can stimulate pharmaceutical companies to develop 
medicines for neglected diseases, is by means of a Health Impact Fund (HIF) that supplements 
the existing market system. The idea is that a government-supported prize fund is used to reward 
owners of patents on medicines on the basis of the impact of these medicines on global health 
(measured in, e.g., disability-adjusted life years). The more a medicine reduces the global burden 
of disease, the more money its patent holder receives from the HIF (Hollis 2008; Hollis & Pogge 
                                                 
2
 A neglected disease can be defined as a disease “that multinational pharmaceutical companies ignore on the 
grounds that, however many potential buyers there might be for a future drug, the overall revenue accruing would be 
too small to meet the constraints of profitability” (Reiss & Kitcher 2009, 265). 
3
 This description is based on Hollis (2008, 126). Hollis does not favor AMCs, but he does offer the most 
comprehensive description of the underlying idea I think. AMCs are proposed and defended by Kremer & 
Glennerster (2004). For an example of an AMC, and the difficulties that could arise, see Light (2011). 
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2008; Pogge 2005, 2007a, 2007b, 2009a, 2009b). As neglected diseases constitute a considerable 
part of the global burden of disease, developing medicines for these diseases would be a 
promising strategy to claim payments from the HIF. 
The main problem with prizes to stimulate neglected-disease research is that they will only 
stimulate pharmaceutical companies to invest in R&D for medicines to treat neglected diseases if 
they make such R&D projects at least as profitable as the projects currently pursued, that is, R&D 
projects for products that sell in affluent countries. Since the profits from the latter projects are 
extremely high (in 2008, the pharmaceutical industry had a profit margin of 19.3% of revenues),4 
this means that the prizes would have to be high as well (also see Reiss & Kitcher 2009, 274; 
Reiss 2010, 439). This is problematic because the public (indirectly) pays for these prizes, and 
because there is, I believe, an alternative way to promote neglected-disease research that requires 
less money from the public (see 3.3). 
Reiss & Kitcher (2009) think this problem may be solved by reducing the profit margin of the 
pharmaceutical industry (e.g., by reducing patent duration). Less prize money would then be 
needed for the profits from neglected-disease projects to match the profits from the projects 
currently pursued. There may, however, be a dilemma: either the average profit margin of the 
pharmaceutical industry would not be substantially reduced, so that the prize money for 
neglected-disease research would still have to be very high, or the average profit margin and the 
prize money would be so low that the effect is not that private investors invest more in neglected-
disease research, but rather that they are chased away to other, more profitable sectors than the 
pharmaceutical sector. Empirical research should reveal whether this dilemma actually occurs in 
practice. 
I would also like to stress that pull funding can be used for more than to stimulate the 
development of medicines for neglected diseases. We can also use prize money to reward, and 
thus stimulate, the development of other instruments that can help us solve poor people’s health 
problems, such as diagnostic tools, measures to reduce pollution, measures to eliminate social 
disparities in access to proper nutrition, decent housing, and medical care, measures to eliminate 
exploitation and unhealthy working conditions, etc. But the aforementioned problem of pull 
funding is relevant in this context as well: artificially high prizes may be required to attract 
private investors. 
3.2. Push funding 
As pull funding may require a lot of money from the public to stimulate research that is 
tailored to the health problems of the poor, push funding may be a more promising strategy to 
promote such research. Reiss & Kitcher (2009) and Reiss (2010) propose the establishment of an 
institute for global health that is analogous to the U.S. National Institutes of Health (NIH), but 
committed to global health issues. What can we expect from such Global Institutes of Health 
(GIH)? 
According to the website of the NIH, “[m]ore than 80% of the NIH’s funding is awarded 
through almost 50,000 competitive grants to more than 325,000 researchers at over 3,000 
universities, medical schools, and other research institutions in every state and around the 
world.”5 Since the GIH are analogous to the NIH, we can expect most of the GIH’s funding to be 
awarded through competitive grants as well. As GIH grants will primarily be used for research 
                                                 
4
 See http://money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/fortune500/2009/performers/industries/profits/. 
5
 See http://www.nih.gov/about/budget.htm. 
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that aims at the promotion of health in developing countries, the problem that too few resources 
are allocated to such research is solved, or at least mitigated. 
An important advantage of research grants is that the public does not have to pay for high 
profits for private investors. One could remark that push funding implies that public money is 
allocated before the research is conducted or during research, while pull funding entails that 
public money is spent after research is finished. The fact that the government has to invest earlier 
in the case of push funding comes with a cost. Assume that the government gets the money for 
push funding by issuing government bonds. After research is finished, the government would not 
only have to reimburse the money it borrowed to fund research, but also interest. The interest rate 
of government bonds is, however, substantially lower than the average profit margin of the 
pharmaceutical industry. Therefore, push funding requires less money from the public than pull 
funding. 
But just as prizes, research grants are not entirely trouble-free. Let me sum up some problems 
identified by Hollis & Pogge (2008). A first problem is that the financial incentives of employees 
of granting agencies to select the projects that are most likely to result in valuable innovation are 
relatively weak. For a for-profit company, spending less money on unsuccessful projects leads to 
higher profits, and its employees will financially benefit from this. Such a financial incentive is 
absent in granting agencies; employees of such agencies do not profit from selecting the most 
successful projects. Personal research interests, familiarity with the applicants and political 
factors are then more likely to influence decisions on which projects are funded, which could lead 
to resources not being allocated to the projects with the greatest health impact (Hollis & Pogge 
2008, 101-102). 
Secondly, the financial incentives of innovators to finish their research and translate their 
findings into health outcomes (for medicines, this is done by conducting clinical trials, marketing 
the medicine to physicians and distributing it to patients) are relatively weak. For a for-profit 
company, bringing a product to market is usually required to recover its investments and make a 
profit, and this incentive is sufficient to get the company to support expensive clinical trials, 
marketing activities and distribution to patients. Such a strong financial incentive is usually 
absent for recipients of research grants (Hollis & Pogge 2008, 102). 
A third problem is that research grants do not guarantee that the medicines developed through 
the research granted are accessible to the poor. The medicines developed through publicly funded 
research can still be sold at high monopoly prices, hindering access for the poor. Pull 
mechanisms such as AMCs and the HIF, on the other hand, offer incentives to make medicines 
accessible to as much people as possible (Hollis & Pogge 2008, 102-103). 
Fourthly, direct funding of research may lack stability over the long term, which could cause 
the termination of research before it is completed (Hollis & Pogge 2008, 103). I do not, however, 
consider this a comparative disadvantage of push funding, since it is, in my opinion, a problem 
for pull funding as well. 
Hollis & Pogge (2008, 101) also identify a fifth problem. They state that a granting agency 
usually has incomplete information about the research proposals submitted to the agency. 
Accordingly, it is hard for a granting agency to estimate the probability that the projects proposed 
will result in valuable innovation. This difficulty may cause inefficient allocation of funding: the 
projects that are most likely to result in valuable innovation may not get funded, while projects 
with a lower probability of success do get funded. 
I think, however, that this objection is misleading. To rebut it, we should distinguish two 
phases of project selection: first, researchers decide which projects they submit to the granting 
agency, and second, the granting agency decides which projects to fund. The problem of 
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incomplete information is only a problem for the latter decision, in which granting agencies “tend 
to rely heavily on the past research record of the investigator – in general, only those 
investigators who have been successful in the past will be supported in the future” (Hollis & 
Pogge 2008, 101). How is project selection in for-profit companies? Roughly stated, they first 
decide which researchers they hire, and then, these researchers decide which projects are pursued. 
In the first phase, for-profit companies rely, just as granting agencies, heavily on the past research 
record of the investigator. It seems, then, that decisions are made quite similarly in both cases; the 
order of the decisions is reversed, but the information used is basically the same. Therefore, 
stating that decision making in granting agencies is based on incomplete information while 
decision making in for-profit companies is based on complete information, is misleading. 
3.3. An alternative proposal 
So far, we have seen that neither prizes nor research grants are without problems. It seems that 
we have to choose: either the costs for the public are high because government money is used to 
finance high profits for private investors, or the health impact of the research funded is limited 
due to relatively weak financial incentives. I believe, however, that we can avoid both problems 
at the same time; the research funded can have the greatest health impact at a low cost for the 
public. 
Before I explain how this might be possible, it should be noted that the aforementioned 
objections of Hollis & Pogge (2008) do not so much challenge the idea of government funding 
for health research as such, but rather the way in which public funds are usually distributed, that 
is, through research grants allocated by central granting agencies that do not substantially benefit 
from selecting the most successful projects. This leaves open the possibility that there are 
alternative ways in which government funds can be distributed and to which the objections under 
consideration do not apply. 
I think the comparative disadvantages of research grants mentioned by Hollis & Pogge can be 
avoided by increasing government funding of not-for-profit non-governmental organizations that 
aim at promoting public health in the Third World, and more specifically, of those organizations 
that are most successful.6 Examples of such organizations are the Medicines for Malaria Venture 
(MMV), the TB Alliance, the Drugs for Neglected Diseases Initiative (DNDi), the Institute for 
OneWorld Health (iOWH), and the Special Programme for Research and Training in Tropical 
Diseases (TDR).7 These five organizations aim at the development of drugs for neglected 
diseases. They “do not conduct drug development themselves, that is, they do not have their own 
laboratories, manufacturing plant or distribution networks, although they may manage or conduct 
some aspects in house, for example regulatory work” (Moran et al. 2005, 32). Rather, these 
organizations “integrate the development process across multiple partners and/or subcontractors” 
(this role “is similar to the role played by multinational companies in a modular commercial 
pipeline”), and “act as a fund manager or resource allocator, sourcing philanthropic and public 
funds for neglected disease drug development, and channelling these funds to industry and public 
institutions for the ‘right’ kind of projects (‘right’ from a public health perspective)” (Moran et al. 
2005, 32). 
                                                 
6
 How the performance of these organizations should exactly be assessed, is a question for future research. 
7
 These organizations are usually referred to as public-private partnerships or PPPs. I prefer to use the term ‘not-for-
profit non-governmental organizations’ because I would like to focus on the fact that they do not seek profits, and 
that they are not part of any government, rather than on the fact that they cooperate with industry groups. For doubts 
about the appropriateness of using the term ‘public-private partnership’, see Moran et al. (2005, 31). 
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Consider DNDi as an example. DNDi is a non-profit R&D organization that aims primarily at 
the development of safe, effective and affordable drugs for patients suffering from the most 
neglected communicable diseases, such as human African trypanosomiasis (HAT), visceral 
leishmaniasis (VL), and Chagas disease. In 2003, it was founded by one humanitarian 
organization, Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF), one international research organization, TDR, 
and five public sector research organizations, the Kenya Medical Research Institute (KEMRI), 
the Indian Council of Medical Research (ICMR), the Ministry of Health of Malaysia (MOH), the 
Oswaldo Cruz Foundation (FIOCRUZ) from Brazil, and the Pasteur Institute from France 
(Pécoul 2004). It has the legal status of an independent, not-for-profit foundation in accordance with 
articles 80 ff. of the Swiss Civil Code. It is administered by a Board of Directors including a patient 
representative and nominees of MSF, KEMRI, ICMR, MOH, FIOCRUZ and the Pasteur Institute, 
and it is managed by an Executive Team consisting of (1) an Executive Director that is appointed 
by the Board of Directors, and (2) staff members appointed by this Executive Director (DNDi 
2003). 
DNDi is funded through grants, in-kind contributions and cash donations coming from 
governments, public institutions, foundations, non-governmental organizations, companies, 
individuals and other mechanisms. In 2010, it obtained approximately half of its funding from 
public sources (mainly from the governments of the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Spain and 
France), with the other half coming from private sources (mainly from MSF and the Bill & 
Melinda Gates Foundation) (DNDi 2010). DNDi operates according to the virtual research mode, 
which means that most research is outsourced and actively managed by DNDi personnel 
experienced in different aspects of pharmaceutical development. DNDi identifies the R&D 
opportunities that are most promising to develop improved treatments for the targeted diseases, 
builds the full development plan, and finds and contracts the most appropriate partner(s) for each 
stage of the R&D process (DNDi 2007a). 
That this model can work, is shown by the valuable innovations resulting from DNDi’s efforts. 
In 2007, Artesunate-Amodiaquine Winthrop® (ASAQ), a non-patented fixed-dose antimalarial 
meeting the highest standard of quality, was launched as a result of an innovative partnership 
between DNDi and pharmaceutical giant sanofi-aventis. The project leading to this innovation, 
the FACT (Fixed-Dose Artesunate Combination Therapy) project, was operated under a grant 
from the European Commission’s International Cooperation and Development (INCO-DEV) 
programme. One of the terms of the contract between DNDi and INCO-DEV was collaboration 
with an industrial partner for industrial validation, production and distribution. DNDi was able to 
keep with these terms; its negotiations led to a contract agreement with sanofi-aventis in 2004. 
This agreement stated that neither DNDi nor sanofi-aventis would take a patent covering ASAQ, 
that sanofi-aventis would supply ASAQ at cost to the public sector, to non-governmental 
organizations such as MSF, and to international organizations such as the WHO, and that, in 
exchange for the information and data that DNDi releases to the private sector, sanofi-aventis 
would pay 3% of net sales to DNDi for seven years after launch of the drug (which is used by 
DNDi to further reduce the price of ASAQ to the public sector). It should be noted that besides 
DNDi and sanofi-aventis, several other entities were involved in the development of ASAQ as 
well: academics from the University of Oxford and Mahidol University offered expert advice 
throughout the entire period of development; Phase I trials were conducted at the University of 
Sains Malaysia; Phase III trials were performed by the Centre for Malaria Research in Burkina 
Faso (which is part of Burkina Faso’s Ministry of Health) and publicly traded company Cardinal 
Health (France); etc. (Banerji & Pécoul 2007; DNDi 2007b; Pécoul et al. 2008). 
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The launch of ASAQ is not the only success of DNDi. Other accomplishments that DNDi 
made possible include the launch of a fixed-dose combination of Artesunate-Mefloquine 
(ASMQ) to treat malaria in 2008,8 and the launch of Nifurtimox-Eflornithine Combination 
Therapy (NECT), an improved treatment for stage 2 HAT, in 2009.9 
Not-for-profit non-governmental organizations can also promote public health in developing 
countries by supporting other kinds of research than drug development. Aeras, the International 
AIDS Vaccine Initiative (IAVI) and the International Vaccine Institute (IVI) develop vaccines 
that can be used in the Third World; the International Partnership for Microbicides (IPM) 
develops microbicides to protect healthy people in developing countries from becoming infected 
with HIV during sex; and the Foundation for Innovative New Diagnostics (FIND) develops 
innovative and affordable diagnostic products for developing countries. An organization that is 
especially interesting in this context is the Program for Appropriate Technology in Health 
(PATH). PATH is an international non-profit organization that does not only support the 
development of products such as vaccines, diagnostic tests and contraceptive devices, but also 
supports social approaches to health problems. An example is the health-education street theater 
that C. Y. Gopinath organized for PATH in order to get the community to talk about health issues 
such as AIDS (Davidow 2005). 
The costs for the public associated with a strategy based on not-for-profit non-governmental 
organizations may be lower than the costs for the public associated with pull funding. For pull 
funding to stimulate projects that are tailored to the health problems of the poor, it has to make 
such projects at least as profitable as alternative activities. This means that payments from the 
patient and from the government-supported prize fund do not only have to cover the expenses 
associated with such projects, but also high profits. The public does not have to pay for high 
profits if non-profit organizations tackle the health problems of the poor. (Again, the government 
may have to pay interests on the money it borrows to support non-profit organizations, but these 
interests are substantially lower than the average profits of the pharmaceutical industry.) 
The aforementioned comparative disadvantages of research grants are avoided as well. Under 
my scheme, not-for-profit non-governmental organizations are stimulated to make sure that a 
research project is only approved if it is expected to result in valuable innovation, that research is 
finished, and that the results are translated into health outcomes in the Third World (which 
requires that the medicines developed are accessible to the poor). The less valuable innovation 
results from the research supported by such an organization, the more likely it is that 
governments and other funding sources reallocate funding to other, more successful 
organizations. If research is not finished, or if the results are not translated into third-world health 
outcomes, we can expect funding sources to cut funding as well. Organizations that are more 
successful are, on the other hand, more likely to attract additional funding and to flourish, which 
is beneficial to their employees (they do not lose their income, there is room for promotions, 
etc.). 
One may object that the financial incentives at these organizations are still not as strong as the 
financial incentives at for-profit companies because there is no risk of losing one’s investments 
and no opportunity to make a profit. That this difference between not-for-profit non-
governmental organizations and for-profit pharmaceutical companies is less significant than it 
seems becomes clear once we take a look at the situations of those actually doing the work for 
modern for-profit pharmaceutical companies. These are usually not the private investors whose 
                                                 
8
 See http://www.dndi.org/index.php/asmq.html?ids=3. 
9
 See http://www.dndi.org/index.php/nect.html?ids=3. 
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fate ranges from losing all their investments to making huge profits. Rather, they are employees 
who get paid even before products are developed and sold, and whose rewards for successfully 
bringing certain products to market are restricted to keeping or possibly increasing their income. 
It seems, then, that they are more or less in the same situation as those doing the work for not-for-
profit non-governmental organizations; their financial incentives to perform well are comparable. 
The people with stronger financial interests in the company’s success (the investors) are usually 
people that do not substantially contribute to this success; their tasks are restricted to deciding 
whether and how much to invest, and voting on matters such as mergers, takeovers, and who is in 
the company’s board of directors. In the not-for-profit non-governmental organizations I support, 
these tasks are performed by governments (and possibly philanthropists) who do not seek profits, 
and who could, I think, perform these tasks just as adequately as profit seekers (but for 
considerably less money). 
3.4. Some remarks 
Before I turn to the third sub-problem, I would like to make three remarks. The first is that my 
scheme can supplement the existing system, in which basic research is publicly funded and 
mainly conducted at universities, and in which for-profit pharmaceutical companies support 
commercially interesting R&D. Although my scheme can be accompanied by a reform of this 
system (see below), such a reform is not required; the existing system can remain intact. 
A second remark is that the arguments I offered in favor of my proposal are mainly 
speculative, which means that they do not enable us to definitely determine which policy option 
(prizes, research grants, or not-for-profit non-governmental organizations) is best. Empirical 
research is required for this: different policy options should be put into practice (initially at a 
small scale), and they should be compared on the basis of how well they solve the problem, their 
health impact and their cost for the public. But this does not imply that speculative arguments are 
worthless. Such arguments are important to determine which policy options are worth further 
empirical investigation. We should not empirically test every possible policy option we can think 
of, as this would lead to an enormous waste; only the policy options for which we have reason to 
believe that they will have the best outcomes (those options from which we can expect, based on 
speculative discussions, that they will most substantially reduce distortion while having the 
greatest health impact at a minimal cost for the public), should be empirically tested. The 
discussion offered in 3.1-3.3 presents some speculative reasons to believe that the policy I 
proposed is the one with the best outcomes. 
Some empirical research assessing the performance of not-for-profit non-governmental 
organizations has already been conducted. Moran et al. (2005) compare five not-for-profit non-
governmental organizations aiming at neglected-disease drug development (MMV, the TB 
Alliance, DNDi, iOWH and TDR) with industry working alone and public groups working alone, 
using the following metrics: health value for developing country patients (safety, efficacy, 
suitability and affordability), level of innovation, capacity (ability to make drugs), development 
times, cost and cost-efficiency. The study shows that not-for-profit non-governmental 
organizations perform better than industry working alone and public groups working alone on 
most metrics used. It should, however, be noted that Moran et al. (2005) have limited data on 
primarily public drug development, since this is rare. We should also distinguish industry-alone 
neglected-disease projects under the existing system from industry-alone neglected-disease 
projects under a system such as the one Thomas Pogge proposes (see 3.1); it is not because the 
former have, e.g., relatively low health value (compared to projects supported by not-for-profit 
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non-governmental organizations), that the latter projects will have relatively low health value as 
well. So if we want to determine whether not-for-profit non-governmental organizations perform 
better than public groups working alone and than for-profit companies competing for prize 
money, more empirical research is required. 
A third remark is that different policies may be appropriate for different kinds of research. For 
instance, it is possible that the best way to promote R&D for medicines for neglected diseases is 
by means of not-for-profit non-governmental organizations, while the best way to promote 
environmental approaches to third-world health problems is to establish an institute for global 
health that allocates grants to such research performed at the university. A reason for this could 
be that not-for-profit non-governmental organizations that develop medicines for neglected 
diseases can engage in commercial activities (they can sell the medicines developed), while 
environmental approaches are harder to combine with commercial activities. If we would then 
assume that not-for-profit non-governmental organizations can only efficiently achieve goals that 
can be combined with commercial activities,10 we could expect them to be good at developing 
medicines for neglected diseases, but bad at studying third-world health problems from an 
environmental perspective. Future empirical research is needed to determine which policies are 
most appropriate for which kinds of research. (It should be noted, however, that the arguments 
offered above suggest that a strategy based on not-for-profit non-governmental organizations is 
most appropriate in general, that is, with respect to all different kinds of research concerning poor 
people’s health problems. More research is needed because these arguments are speculative.) 
4. Alternative solutions to health problems 
The second kind of distortion (distortion towards R&D for medicines) will be discussed in two 
parts: first with respect to the health problems of the poor, and next with respect to the health 
problems of the non-poor. Let us start with the health problems of the poor. In the previous 
section, I proposed to increase public funding of not-for-profit non-governmental organizations 
that deal with these problems. In order to avoid that such organizations only support R&D for 
medicines, governments can demand that they spend a certain percentage of their resources on 
alternative approaches to health problems (e.g., social or environmental approaches) in exchange 
for funding. Another, maybe more simple strategy is to allocate funding to organizations that 
already pay significant attention to such alternative approaches, such as PATH. Note that the 
more governments use the latter funding strategy, the stronger the incentive for organizations to 
pay significant attention to alternative approaches to health problems (assumed that they want to 
claim government funding). 
Since I believe the best way to promote research concerning poor people’s health problems is 
by increasing public support of not-for-profit non-governmental organizations that aim at 
tackling these problems (see section 3), I think adopting one or both of these strategies is 
sufficient to make sure that a sufficient percentage of the research concerning poor people’s 
health problems focuses on other solutions than medicines. But I also left open the possibility that 
other strategies are more cost-effective at tackling the health problems of the poor (future 
empirical research is needed to exclude this possibility). Therefore, I would like to mention that 
there are also other ways to promote research that supports the development of alternative 
solutions to poor people’s health problems: (part of the) prize money that is used to reward 
                                                 
10
 I do not endorse this assumption. 
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research that is tailored to the health problems of the poor can be dedicated more specifically to 
research on the effects of certain lifestyles, environmental approaches to health problems, etc., or 
the management agreement of an institute for global health can state that the institute should 
allocate specific percentages of its grants to such kinds of research. 
Now, let us consider the third sub-problem with respect to the health problems of the non-
poor. Possible strategies to make sure that enough research focuses on other solutions to their 
problems than medicines are: offering prize money to anyone who has developed such a solution, 
devoting more research grants to research that supports the development of such solutions, and 
supporting not-for-profit non-governmental organizations that aim at the development of such 
solutions. Since these strategies are analogous to the strategies to tackle the second sub-problem 
we discussed, most of the points made in the previous section can be transferred to this context. 
For instance, pull funding may be more costly to the public than necessary because payments 
from the public do not only have to cover the costs of research, but profits for private investors as 
well. Research grants only have to cover research costs. But the health impact of research that is 
supported by grants may be limited for any of the following reasons: employees of granting 
agencies have relatively weak financial incentives to select the projects with the highest health 
impact, and the recipients of research grants have relatively weak financial incentives to finish 
research and translate the results into health outcomes. 
An alternative strategy, which is analogous to the strategy I defended in the previous section, 
is to increase government funding of not-for-profit non-governmental organizations that aim at 
the development of other solutions to the health problems of the non-poor than medicines, and 
more specifically, of those organizations that are most successful. Examples of such 
organizations are the Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation, the American Institute for Cancer 
Research, and Public Health Solutions. This scheme may, in the long term, be less costly to the 
public than pull funding since no public money is used to finance profits for private investors. It 
also avoids the aforementioned disadvantages of research grants: the persons who decide whether 
or not a research project is supported are stimulated to only approve a project if they expect it to 
result in knowledge that is useful for health development (contributing to health development is 
crucial if the organization wants to claim further funding, and further funding is beneficial to the 
organization’s employees), and the organization is stimulated to make sure that research is 
finished and that the results are translated into health outcomes (again, this is important if the 
organization wants to claim further funding). 
Despite the similarities between the proposal defended in the previous section and the one 
defended in this section, it is possible that not-for-profit non-governmental organizations are 
perfect for tackling poor people’s health problems, while they are far from perfect for developing 
non-profitable solutions to health problems that mainly affect the wealthy, and vice versa. There 
is a huge difference between developing medicines for the third-world market on the one hand, 
and developing diets or exercise schemes for people in affluent countries on the other hand. 
Different kinds of environments and different kinds of research are involved. Although I have 
offered some arguments in favor of the claim that not-for-profit non-governmental organizations 
will be most cost-effective at both tackling poor people’s health problems and developing other 
solutions to the health problems of the non-poor than medicines, further empirical research is 
needed to definitely determine which kinds of activities can be successfully performed by not-
for-profit non-governmental organizations. 
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5. Comparison with earlier proposals 
Before I conclude, let me compare my recommendations with earlier policy proposals. First, 
consider James Robert Brown’s proposal. Brown offers the following recommendations: 
 
Socialize research. Eliminate intellectual property rights in medicine. Make all funding public 
(including government and independent foundations and charities). (Brown 2008a, 762) 
 
If all funding is made public, a lot of private funding for medical research would be lost. 
Therefore, public funding should be raised. According to Brown (2008b, 209-210), public 
funding should be adjusted to appropriate levels. He does not think that this means that current 
levels of funding (including both private and public funding) should be matched. He states that: 
 
Drug companies claim that it costs on average more than $800 million to bring a new drug to 
market. This, however, is a gross exaggeration. Something like $100 million is a more 
reasonable estimate, since marketing costs (which they include) are not part of genuine 
research. Moreover, many research projects are for “me too” drugs, which bring little or no 
benefit to the public. When we take these factors into account, it is clear that we can maintain 
a very high level of research for considerably less public money. (Brown 2008b, 210)11 
 
Implementing Brown’s proposal is not sufficient to substantially reduce the first kind of 
distortion (the agenda features too little research that is tailored to the health problems of the 
poor). We have seen that the lack of interest in solving the health problems of the poor is not only 
a problem for industry funded research, but also for research that is publicly funded. Making all 
funding public will not significantly promote research concerning the health issues of the poor as 
long as public funding in high-income countries is primarily allocated to research that is tailored 
to their own disease burden. The needs of the poor living in middle- or low-income countries will 
remain more or less neglected. Hence, Brown’s scheme should be supplemented by a strategy to 
make sure that sufficient funding goes to research concerning the health issues of these countries. 
In 3.3, I have presented such a strategy. 
Brown’s scheme does eliminate the second kind of distortion (the agenda features too little 
research that supports the development of other solutions to health problems than medicines). Let 
me explain this. The reason that publicly funded agencies (which are the only agencies 
conducting health research under Brown’s system) currently have to prefer R&D for medicines 
over alternative kinds of health research, is that R&D for medicines can lead to revenues from 
patents. If patents would be eliminated in medicine, as Brown recommends, this reason to prefer 
R&D for medicines over alternative kinds of health research would disappear. Accordingly, we 
can expect distortion towards R&D for medicines to disappear if Brown’s proposal would be 
implemented. 
An advantage of Brown’s scheme is that it also deals with the epistemic failures of current 
biomedical research. Currently, for-profit companies often design and report research 
inadequately (e.g., compare a new product with inadequate doses of existing products, duplicate 
                                                 
11
 I do not endorse this quotation. DiMasi, Hansen & Grabowski (2003) estimate that total R&D cost per new drug is 
$802 million, and these costs do not include marketing costs. Although this may be more than is strictly needed to 
bring a new drug to market, Brown’s estimate of $100 million seems far from the mark, as the mean cost of Phase III 
clinical trial is $115.2 million for approved drugs (DiMasi, Hansen & Grabowski 2003, 171). 
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publication of positive findings and suppression of negative or non-significant findings) 
(Bekelman, Li & Gross 2003; Lexchin et al. 2003; Schott et al. 2010). Because these failures are 
typical for for-profit research, we can expect them to occur less frequently if all funding of 
medical research is made public and if intellectual property rights are eliminated in medicine, as 
Brown proposes. My scheme does not deal with the epistemic failures of current biomedical 
research. It should, however, be noted that it can be supplemented by a strategy that does, such as 
implementing Brown’s scheme, the strategy that Justin Biddle (2007) proposes (which will not be 
discussed in this article), or the strategy that Julian Reiss proposes (see below); my proposal does 
not preclude these policy options. 
An important difference between my proposal and Brown’s proposal is that my proposal does 
not require a radical departure from the existing system, in which a lot of biomedical research is 
pursued by for-profit pharmaceutical companies. The not-for-profit non-governmental 
organizations I support can supplement these companies; it is not required that these companies 
are replaced, nor that the existing intellectual property regime is eradicated. While the existing 
system is certainly not optimal, for-profit pharmaceutical companies do develop medicines and 
successfully bring them to market, resulting in better public health. If research performed at these 
companies would be replaced by, say, university research, and if intellectual property rights 
would be eliminated in medicine, the danger exists that useful medicines would no longer be 
successfully brought to market (after all, the Bayh-Dole Act was enacted in 1980 because the 
results of government-funded university research weren’t transformed into useful products, see 
Reiss & Kitcher 2009, 280), and that the health outcomes that would be achieved under the 
existing system would no longer be achieved.12 My proposal avoids this danger as profitable lines 
of biomedical research could be left to for-profit pharmaceutical companies. So implementing my 
proposal is less risky than implementing Brown’s proposal; it does not put the merits of the 
existing system at risk. 
Another research policy that does not imply a radical departure from the existing system, is the 
one proposed by Thomas Pogge. I already summarized Pogge’s proposal in 3.1 (we should 
establish, as a supplement to the current market system, a Health Impact Fund that is used to 
reward owners of patents on medicines proportional to the impact of these medicines on global 
health), and argued that it may be more costly to the public than necessary. Pogge’s scheme 
implies that public money is used to finance high profits for the pharmaceutical industry, and 
such expenses are avoided under the scheme I proposed. It should also be noted that 
implementing Pogge’s scheme would not reduce distortion towards R&D for medicines (Pogge 
does not claim that it would), but only distortion towards research on the health issues of the rich, 
and that it would solve the latter problem in a non-optimal way. Implementing Pogge’s proposal 
would only stimulate R&D for medicines, since only patentees of medicines are eligible for 
payments from the HIF. This is not optimal because alternative kinds of research (e.g., social or 
environmental approaches to poor people’s health problems) are often more useful for health 
development in the Third World than R&D for medicines. 
Finally, consider Julian Reiss’s (2010) proposal. It consists of five recommendations:13 
 
(1) Patent duration and/or breadth14 should be reduced; 
                                                 
12
 Brown (2008a, 763-764) provides an argument for the claim that implementing his proposal will not lead to 
inefficiency, but this argument is not convincing, as is shown in De Winter (forthcoming). 
13
 Reiss groups the third and the fourth recommendation in one section, under the heading “Aligning commercial and 
(global) patients’ incentives” (Reiss 2010, 444). 
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(2) Clinical trials should be run by an independent body committed to neutral hypothesis 
testing and overlooked by a board whose members represent different stakeholders; 
(3) Drugs should only be approved if they are better than all existing therapies, including 
non-medical options; 
(4) Research into neglected diseases should be stimulated by establishing Global Institutes of 
Health (in analogy with the U.S. National Institutes of Health but committed to global 
health issues), by advance purchase commitments (APCs), by awards for research into 
neglected diseases and/or by tax breaks for such research; 
(5) Socially harmful practices such as direct-to-customer advertising, industry sponsorship of 
continuing education events, advertising in medical journals, and payments from industry 
to doctors in the form of consulting fees, gifts, dinners or finders’ fees should be 
prohibited, and these prohibitions should be enforced. 
 
Reiss’s proposal can be distinguished from my proposal in at least three respects. The first 
difference is that I have defended an alternative strategy to promote research into neglected 
diseases (see 3.3 of this article versus Reiss’s fourth recommendation). The second difference is 
that Reiss’s proposal includes recommendations on how to avoid several failures of current 
biomedical research that are not discussed in this paper (e.g., his second recommendation 
indicates how to eliminate the epistemic failures). My proposal does not include such 
recommendations. It should, however, be noted that it is compatible with the ones presented by 
Reiss (his first, second, third and fifth recommendation). And finally, my proposal explicitly puts 
the need to reduce distortion towards R&D for medicines, both with respect to the health 
problems of the poor and with respect to the health problems of the non-poor, on the agenda (see 
section 4), contrary to Reiss’s proposal. 
6. Conclusion 
While there is wide agreement among philosophers of science that the research agenda in the 
health sciences is seriously skewed, and that governments of advanced countries should deal with 
this problem by increasing their investments in neglected lines of research, it is not clear how 
these investments should exactly be allocated. Several investment strategies have been discussed 
in this article. I have argued that, in order to promote research that is currently insufficiently 
funded because it is not profitable enough (either because it concerns the health problems of 
people without sufficient purchasing power, or because it is not the kind of research that supports 
the development of medicines), governments should increase funding of not-for-profit non-
governmental organizations that support such research. Non-profit organizations that aim at 
promoting public health in the Third World and non-profit organizations that aim at the 
development of other solutions to the health problems of the non-poor than medicines should get 
more financial support from governments of advanced countries. These governments should 
especially reward the most successful organizations with funding, creating competition for 
funding among non-profit organizations. This competition should guarantee that the 
organizations proceed as efficiently as possible and try to achieve the best health outcomes. 
                                                                                                                                                              
14
 By breadth, Reiss means “the range of ideas that are considered worthy of patent protection” (Reiss 2010, 441). 
Patent breadth can be reduced by making things that are patentable under the existing regime (e.g., new uses of 
existing drugs, combinations of existing drugs) non-patentable. 
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Further empirical research is needed to assess my recommendations. Do the changes I suggest 
actually make the agenda less distorted? Do they result in cost-effective public health 
development? Answering these questions requires empirical research. Another interesting topic 
for further research is a cost-benefit analysis of my scheme for other agents than the public, such 
as for-profit pharmaceutical companies, hospitals, insurance companies and universities. These 
issues are not addressed in this article, which means that it does not enable us to definitely 
determine whether the reforms I propose are actually the best strategies to deal with the distorted 
research agenda. The main virtues of this article lie elsewhere: (1) the article draws attention to 
some alternative strategies to deal with the distorted research agenda in the health sciences, and 
(2) it shows that these strategies are at least worth further (empirical) investigation (by offering 
speculative arguments for the claim that these strategies are more promising than alternative 
strategies). 
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